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Do “peranakan” in Malaysia relate well with peranakan in Indonesia, 
Singapore, and Brunei, or with “tsinoy" in the Philippines? Given 
the historical reality that they are relative newcomers in the nation-
states, how do the peranakan view the concept of nationality? Do 
they see ASEAN more as a “home” rather than simply a country of 
residence? Does the presence of Chinese communities in most parts 
of SEA serve as a cultural thread toward ASEAN Identity? This 
study investigates the (non)formation of ASEAN Identity among 
ethnic Chinese in SEA based on various historical records from the  
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colonial era up to the present. At one point, the locals in each 
country tended to cooperate with the ethnic Chinese, but after 
Independence when the latter began to obtain more economic 
gains, the institutionalization of concepts such as “asli” and 
“bumiputra” took place, resulting in antagonism, domination, and 
later, resistance. The centuries-old struggle with adaptation and 
non-acceptance contributes to the delay in welcoming the idea of 
an ASEAN Identity among ethnic Chinese. 
Keywords: Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, Peranakan and Tsinoy, 
ASEAN Identity, ASEAN Regional Integration 
 
The mosaic of ASEAN Identities: Issues, challenges,  
and prospects in the formation of ASEAN Identity among 
ethnic Chinese in insular Southeast Asia 
 
Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia 
he most common feature that characterizes the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the diversity in cultures of 
its member states. This unity-in-diversity also serves as the guiding 
principle in the development and continuity of ASEAN as a regional 
organization (Acharya, 1999; Jones, 2004). The diversity is being 
further complicated by differences in religions within and among 
countries as well as varieties in ethnicities. Even the predominantly 
Catholic Philippines and Islamic Indonesia have a population of 
ethnic Chinese (EC).1 As a result, it may be more difficult for ASEAN 
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to build the so called “ASEAN Identity,” one of the key components 
of ASEAN regional integration. The concept has been loosely defined 
as the “collective personality, norms, values, and beliefs as well as 
aspirations as one ASEAN community.”2 
This study investigates the (non)formation of ASEAN Identity 
among EC in insular Southeast Asia (SEA). I speculate that with the 
exemption of Malaysia, EC are most assimilated in this part of SEA 
either because of the less strict rules of the governments here after the 
colonial era or because of the forced assimilation that had happened. 
Gungwu (1988) explains this as a result of the relatively smaller 
population in the countries wherein “Chinese identity was believed 
to be ultimately containable and . . . eventually be replaced by the 
new local national identity that was being offered” to them (p. 3). 
Today, approximately 23 million or about 80 percent of EC live in 
SEA (Suryadinata, 2007, p. 3, p. 89). More than half of this number 
lives in Insular SEA. 
Table 1 
Population of EC in insular SEA 
 Population (in millions) Percentage 
Brunei 0.42 11-16% 
Indonesia 2.8 – 5 1.2 - 2 % 
Malaysia 5.5 - 6.24 22.04 - 24.8% 
Singapore 4.1 74.3% 
Philippines 1 1% 
TOTAL 13.82 - 16.76  
Suryadinata, 2006; Suryadinata, 2007; Kang, 2015; www.bbc.com; 
www.minorityrights.org; www.singstat.gov.sg 
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The study explores, first, the ambivalence of the EC experience as 
a result of external and internal forces. The first assumption is that 
EC in SEA are assimilated in the countries they live in because of the 
inhospitable economic, political, and cultural policies in China3 
which either forced them to move to or remain in SEA. The 
accommodating roles of some colonizers, particularly the British, 
also led to this assimilation. On the other hand, the identity 
formation favorable to the new local identity may be hindered by 
what Benedict Anderson (2003) calls “Imagined Community” which 
describes a nation as an “imagined political community” by people 
who perceive themselves as part of that group. This means that even 
EC outside China may also imagine themselves as Chinese. 
Second, the study posits that there are more similarities among 
SEA states aside from the experience of colonization. This is being 
taken for granted by some scholars who focus on the shared colonial 
experience as a point of convergence. Additionally, Jones (2004) 
argues that less attention has been given to address the diversity in 
culture and ethnicities in regional integration, and more towards 
economy and politics. The many centuries of migrations and 
intermarriages before and during the colonial era may have also 
contributed to the so-called early form of regionalization. The 
question however is if these historical relations have something to do 
with the present workings of ASEAN today. Do hybrid communities 
make the formation of ASEAN Identity easier? Do “peranakan”4 in 
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Malaysia relate well with peranakan in Indonesia, Singapore, and 
Brunei or with the “tsinoy”5 in the Philippines, thus making the 
concept of ASEAN Identity more possible in the advent of ASEAN 
regional integration? Although it does not completely focus on this 
issue, this paper lays the ground for further studies on the topic.  
Third, the idea of being “pure” also contributes to the EC’s notion 
of identity. Many scholars have referred to this as “Chineseness.” In 
the Philippines, the tendency of EC to marry someone from their 
group or the so-called “great wall” is an example. Hau (2014) 
presents the idea of Chineseness by determining how the Chinese 
culture is embedded in the nation. Additionally, Gungwu (1988) 
posits that “the Chinese have never had a concept of identity, only a 
concept of Chineseness” (p.1). The implication of this is the belief 
that others can be more Chinese, and others, less. In Singapore for 
instance, there is a belief that the Chinese are not pure in either the 
Chinese or local sense. As Suryadinata (2007) argues, the Chinese in 
Singapore have “a sense of local character and are conscious of being 
Singaporeans” and in fact “do not see any conflict between their 
Singaporean nationality and their EC origins” (p. 21). Based on these, 
we can define Chineseness in this paper as the level of Chinese culture 
and tradition that an EC outside of China possesses.  
Fourth, the research steps onto the idea that the issue of ethnicity 
is always a class issue. Focusing on ethnicity issues alone is taking the 
attention of observers from other issues and challenges that hinder  
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the formation of ASEAN identity/ies and cooperation. It is important 
to note that capitalism works as a parasite to racism which may even 
serve as a tactic for dividing the originally united whole. Hau (2014) 
earlier explains this using popular culture and determining how it 
“attempts to defuse the class tensions and nationalist resentment 
ignited by ‘Chineseness’ by turning deterritorialized ‘Chinese’ flows 
and connections into sources of Filipino self-advancement” (pp. 223-
224). It should be noted that Mahathir Mohammad established the 
concept of “bumiputra” not because of ethnic hatred but because of 
economic gains that the EC are perceived to be acquiring in 
Malaysia. That is why EC can be socially or ethnically stratified or 
both. At some point in Insular SEA countries, EC became equated 
with the economically advantaged class. This economic success was 
attributed to the role of EC tycoons, taipans, or Confucian 
businessmen (Chu, 2015, p. 215). This became both a threat and an 
advantage to the EC. Additionally, the so- called “Bamboo Network” 
demonstrates how the concepts of guanxi, kinship, and common 
origin became bases for doing business. Interestingly, according to 
Weidenbaum (1998), most of the investment capital flowing into 
China does not come from the major powers such as Europe, Japan, 
or the United States, but from EC living in SEA. It is important to 
note that after Deng Xiao Ping’s economic liberalization campaign, 
EC in SEA were able to do business with Chinese in the Mainland. 
This interest in engaging in business according to Yen (1995) is 
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because EC are generally an urban class (p. 4). Rather than producing 
landlord and peasant classes, it produced largely merchant and 
worker classes. 
Furthermore, in analyzing the possibility of an ASEAN Identity 
among EC in SEA, the internal policies of China across time periods 
also deserve an important role. For instance, EC in SEA may identify 
more with Chinese in Mainland China because of their economically 
developed status at present. However, the “Chinese Green Card” is 
said to be the world's most difficult to obtain (Zhang & Su, January 
26, 2016). Even EC are not an exemption to these strict rules. 
Nowadays, the card’s main goal is to attract foreign talent. For 
instance, an EC who holds a foreign citizenship and has a high 
educational qualification such as a PhD can apply for the Chinese 
green card (Kor Kian Beng, 2016). 
Gungwu (1988) earlier laid out the importance of studying 
Chinese identity based on changing context and events. It is also 
important to see how the recent initiatives in the ASEAN have 
changed the way EC in the region view themselves. Later, Hirschman 
(1988) expounded the idea, arguing that contemporary conditions 
such as the interaction of Chinese minorities with indigenous 
populations and national governments also shape EC’s identity of 
themselves. This article tries to assess the possibility of an ASEAN 
Identity through a review of their experiences during the colonial 
and post-colonial eras (issues and challenges) and the current status 
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of EC as well as the ongoing development in ASEAN as a region 
(prospects). 
Migration, assimilation, and antagonization of EC in SEA 
Southeast Asia and China have had contacts with each other 
through trade since the Han dynasty but mass migrations started 
only in the mid-nineteenth century (Suryadinata, 2007, p. 50).6 The 
original Chinese settlers in SEA came mainly from three provinces—
Guangdong, Fujian, and the island of Hainan (Schmetzer, 2010, p. 
12). As most scholars studying EC in SEA would say, they were mere 
“sojourners” rather than “settlers” (Gungwu, 2000; Suryadinata, 
2001). Indicative of this is the fact that China claims that Chinese in 
SEA considered themselves as “overseas Chinese” and even intended 
to return to their homeland once economic agenda was fulfilled 
(Suryadinata, 2001, p. 55).7 However, the distinct trait of EC in SEA 
is their readiness to adapt to Western ways early on. As some authors 
would say, they are neither Chinese nor SEAns, but Western 
(Hirschman, 1988; Gungwu, 1988). This may have contributed to 
their assimilation despite the original plan of going back. 
The massive mass migration in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries was due to several factors such as political instability, 
overpopulation, and famine in China (Suryadinata, 2001, p. 58). In 
most cases, Chinese immigrants were composed of unaccompanied 
males (Tan, 1988; Lee, 2013; Wickerberg, 2015). With the lack of 
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Chinese women, Chinese men intermarried with local women and 
eventually settled down in SEA. Later on, the descendants lost the 
command of culture and language at various rates.8 
In most parts of SEA after the 1900s, Chinese immigrants began 
to bring their wives with them (Tan, 1988, p. 182). When the Dutch 
allowed the migration of Chinese women to Java, the intermarriage 
between Chinese men and the locals stopped (Lee, 2013, p. 159). In 
Indonesia, local women had the advantage of being exempted from 
tax if they married Chinese immigrants. Thus, according to Lee 
(2013), whenever ships arrived with Chinese immigrants, the women 
would line up offering marriage to them (p. 159). 
Treatment and perceptions of the EC differ from country to 
country. For instance, Suryadinata (2007) explains the difference 
between how Indonesians and Filipinos view the EC in their 
countries. In Indonesia, the nation is defined in racial rather than 
cultural terms while in the Philippines, the definition is more cultural 
rather than racial. As a result, “acculturation of the EC has 
progressed much more smoothly in the Philippines than in 
Indonesia” (Suryadinata, 2007, p. 19). Moreover, even locally born 
EC who speak Indonesian and other regional languages as their first 
language are not perceived as active participants in the formation of 
culture of “wayang purwa,” which for many serves as the pinnacle of 
Javanese culture (Pausacker, 2005, p. 185). 
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The table below may be too simplistic to completely explain the 
status of EC in SEA countries in the last century, but may help the 
reader in understanding their current conditions. The categories 
indicate whether the situation is favorable towards the EC or not. 
During the colonial period, being “favorable” means that the 
colonizers had been welcoming and accommodating to the EC 
economically and politically. During the Post-Independence and 
Contemporary period, “favorable” is determined not by the colonizer 
but by the locals themselves including the government. 
Table 2 









British Brunei favorable Unfavorable Unfavorable 
Malaysia favorable Unfavorable Unfavorable 
Singapore favorable Favorable Favorable 




Dutch Indonesia favorable un/favorable generally 
favorable 
 
The colonizers,9 although not really in good terms among 
themselves, found one task in common: to use the Chinese in a 
divide-and-rule tactic against the locals. Since they were all incapable 
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of surpassing China’s role in the economy, they later saw the Chinese 
community’s promising roles in terms of trade and eventually used 
them as middlemen (Suryadinata, 2001, p. 57).  
Responses from SEA governments varied after the colonial 
period. Most Insular SEA countries except Malaysia have attempted 
to assimilate the EC into the local population and either reduce their 
economic strength or share economic strength through economic 
coalition (Suryadinata, 2007, p. 18). As an ethnic minority group in 
the region, EC needed to help each other in order to survive in the 
new environments (Suyardinata, 2012). In non-Communist states in  
ASEAN during the Cold War, the EC were considered to be 
communistic (Suryadinata, 2007, p. 11). The institutionalization of 
the concepts asli, totok, and bumiputra also affected how Chinese 
were being treated in the region. In other countries, this was meant 
to delineate the group from the rest (Freedman, 2000, p. 26). The EC 
communities in Malaysia and Singapore that were strong, both in the 
sense of population size and of economic power, had developed a 
“powerful sense of communal identity to assert the community’s 
right to share power in the country” (Gungwu, 1988, p. 4). After 
World War II, most EC slowly gave up their Chinese nationalist 
identities while acquiring a local national one (Gungwu, 1988, p. 10). 
In the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia where EC were a 
minority, they became actors towards nation-building. However, it 
was not always a smooth relationship for both sides. The threat  
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coming from the perceived economic gains of EC resulted in anti-
Chinese concepts and laws. Eventually, these were either scrapped or 
modified favorably to the EC. 
Deepening acculturation in most insular SEAn countries  
after World War II 
In SEAn countries that adopted the market economy, the EC were 
able to achieve major financial gains and were able to emerge as big 
capitalists. This is contrary to socialist economies that have not been so 
accommodating to them because of their capitalist tendencies 
(Suryadinata, 2001, p. 70). More recently, EC in most SEAn states, 
with the exception of Malaysia, began to acknowledge their role as 
citizens even as they are perceived to be threats to the locals (Gungwu, 
1988, p. 7). In reality, these EC are actually the new members of the 
elite class. EC communities only began to participate in politics 
through the mobilization efforts of community leaders when there are 
incentives to do so (Freedman, 2000, p. 14). This may be in the aspects 
of politics, as well as economic and social development. 
The citizenship issue has deeply affected the relations between 
China and SEAn governments. When the People’s Republic of China 
was established in 1949, it continued to use the term “overseas 
Chinese” which led to the suspicions of SEAn governments towards 
EC (Suryadinata, 2007, p. 301). China was aware of this predicament, 
leading them to partner with SEAn governments by offering dual-
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citizenship to the EC during the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung. 
Unfortunately, only Indonesia accepted (Suryadinata, 2007, pp. 301-
302). Acculturation of EC came as an effort from SEAn governments 
to guard their suspicions as to EC’s relations with the communists in 
China. As Suryadinata (2007) puts it, “by making the EC less Chinese, 
the SEA states would feel more secure” (p. 17). In 1980, China 
unilaterally issued the “nationality law” which recognizes only single 
citizenship (Suryadinata, 2007, p. 302). However, in countries like the 
Philippines, the mass naturalization was actually a way of advancing 
the national interest by making sure that the EC residing in the 
Philippines, for instance, would not have any opportunity to side with 
opponents. During the Cold War, the “Chinese Problem” became a 
highlight in many SEAn governments as they were seen as 
homogenous group that could not be integrated and assimilated into 
the new societies they belonged to (Suryadinata, 2007, p. 4). Below is 
more detailed information on the experiences of EC in Insular SEA. 
Brunei10 
The Chinese migrated to Brunei during the British colonial 
period. In the early part of the twentieth century, there were only 
around 500 EC in the country (Brunei Times, April 30, 2012). The 
massive migration happened only after the discovery of oil in 1929 
(Minority Rights, n.d.). Between 1931 and 1947, the EC population  
increased by more than 200 percent. These migrants were mainly  
 






CHINESE STUDIES PROGRAM LECTURE SERIES    © Ateneo de Manila University 
No. 4, 2017: 29–67                                                                    http://journals.ateneo.edu 
 
from Sarawak, Singapore, and Hong Kong (Minority Rights, n.d.). 
The employment opportunities continued to expand, leading to an 
increase in immigration until after World War II. The EC held 
British passports during this time but when they left, they became 
“stateless.” After independence in 1984, only about 9,000 EC were 
given full Brunei citizenship. From being “stateless,” they became 
“permanent residents.”  
The fact that there are no localized terms in Brunei to refer to the 
EC means that they are almost non-existent and unrecognized, not 
only by the state but also by the people. Furthermore, it has been 
reported that it was easier for EC to obtain permanent residency if 
they converted to Islam. Even the required Malay language exam has 
been said to be very complicated for EC who wanted to acquire 
citizenship. The Minority Rights (n.d.) says that the detailed 
knowledge exam which requires terms for local plants and animals is 
discriminatory against non-native speakers, making it more difficult 
to obtain citizenship. Moreover, EC in Brunei cannot directly own 
land and are denied a number of rights such as subsidized medical 
care. This has become a more serious problem when the country’s 
national ideology, “Melayu Islam Beraja” or Malay Islamic 
Monarchy, was institutionalized in 1990. Despite this, EC in Brunei 
are also members of the middle class and dominate the ownership 
and management of non-energy businesses (Oxford Business Group, 
2014).11 
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Indonesia 
When the EC arrived in Indonesia, they were soon separated by a 
clear distinction between the “peranakan” and “totok.” The totok 
were engaged in retail trade and had more contacts with lower-class 
indigenous peoples (Oetomo, 1988, p. 99). Concomitantly, they were 
not concerned with social stratification and had weaker Chinese 
identities (Oetomo, 1988, p. 99). Expectedly, the lower class was 
more indigenized while the upper class was closer to the Dutch. 
However, totok have an advantage over peranakan because of clan 
associations and knowledge of the Chinese language. Oetomo (1988) 
argues that during the colonial period, the use of Indonesian by an 
EC was a “marker” of his or her identity as an Indonesian national 
(p. 101). Lee (2013) posits that if the Dutch had not come to 
Indonesia, the EC would have been completely Javanized either 
through Islam or intermarriage (pp. 158-159). The Dutch treated the 
EC differently from the local Indonesians as they appointed EC 
businessmen as “capitan” to administer their own communities. 
These capitan helped the Dutch recruit many laborers from China to 
work in the rice and sugar plantations. Evidently, the Dutch were 
more concerned with commercial rather than religious gains in 
Indonesia. Unlike the Spanish who forced the EC to seek 
intermarriage in the Philippines, the Dutch had no plans of 
converting them (Lee, 2013, p. 160). At some point, the EC 
supported the Indonesians against the Dutch. The life of Liem Koen 
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Hian, who according to Suryadinata (1977) transformed himself 
from Chinese nationalist to an Indonesian nationalist, is an example. 
Gungwu (1988) argues that after World War II, the strongly 
predominant Chineseness became a problem to the extent that  
indigenous political leaders found it alarming and it later resulted in  
institutionalized racism. When Indonesia gained Independence and 
created the 1945 Constitution which was based mainly on the 
principle of Pancasila, it deliberately used the word “ali” in referring 
to indigenous Indonesians. At the same time, Indonesians 
conceptualized the term “asli” (foreigner) which was originally in 
defense against the Dutch but later on, was extended to the EC 
(Coppel, 2005, p. 2). The Chinese were then required to change their 
names. For a time, they were prohibited from learning the Chinese 
language and celebrating Chinese festivals. Lindsey (2005) further 
identified several forms of discrimination against Chinese 
Indonesians such as higher fees, coded identity, and limited access to 
education. They were also required to obtain a certificate of 
citizenship for which they had to pay an unofficial fee ranging from 
US$ 200 to $700 (Jakarta Post, January 22, 2012). 
The policies of the Indonesian government on Chinese-language 
schools between 1957 and 1966 were instrumental in provoking an 
exodus to China by EC students (Bocquet-Siek, 1988, p. 111). It was 
during this time that EC in Indonesia had better grasp of Chinese 
culture and identity. That was why China was seen as an indirect 
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external threat due to subversive activities especially in pursuing the 
reemergence of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Sukma, 1999, p. 48). 
Like the locals, the EC were targeted as victims of violence as had 
happened in Indonesia during the 1965-1966 communist purging in 
which close to 2,000 Chinese were killed (Sukma, 1999, p. 48). The 
violence escalated only two years following the killings wherein 
incidents like attacks on Chinese consulates in Makassar and Medan 
and expulsion of around 10,000 Chinese in Aceh were reported 
(Purdey, 2005, p. 14). Chinese remigration is interesting as it follows 
a certain trend in their current location and their country of origin, 
China. In Indonesia, for example, remigration happened in 1960 
(following the banning of the retail trade in the rural areas), 1963 
(anti-Chinese riot), 1965 (after the abortive coup), and 1998 (May 
1998 riots) (Suyardinata, 2007, pp. 61-62). 
Today, problems usually persist because of the citizenship 
certificate called Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia 
(SBKRI) which EC need to produce before making any deals with the 
government (Thung, 2012, p. 373). Although there were various 
initiatives towards democratization in the country after the fall of 
Suharto and although the EC community in Indonesia has so long 
demanded the abolition of policies like SBKRI, the latter is unlikely 
to happen because locals perceive many inevitable problems that may 
crop up once it is indeed abandoned. On the side of the EC, 
according to Thung (2012, p. 382), one thing that hinders the  
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naturalization process is the inability of some Chinese to speak 
Indonesian fluently, particularly in areas such as Medan, the Riau 
Islands, and West Kalimantan. 
The situation of EC in Indonesia is much more complicated 
because of the fact that Indonesia is an archipelago which makes the 
country diverse in many aspects. For instance, the Jakartan Chinese 
are different from the Medan Chinese or the Jewan Chinese. 
Furthermore, there exist religious differences among, for instance, 
Catholic Chinese, Buddhist Chinese, Confucian Chinese, and even 
Muslim Chinese.12 Because of this, the heterogeneity cannot be 
applied not only to ASEAN as a regional organization but within the 
country itself. 
Today, Chinese in Indonesia make up 1.2 to two percent of the 
total population. This small percentage is even composed of EC from 
different social backgrounds. There are those who come from the  
middle to upper classes but there are also those who come from the 
lower class. One particular group that experiences perhaps the worse 
poverty among EC in Indonesia is the one in Singkawang, 
Kalimantan. Women of EC origin there face a serious problem of 
human trafficking as they are forced to become mail-order brides to 
get their families out of poverty (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson, 
& Dunn, 2010). 
By the end of the 1990s, EC controlled 78 percent of the private 
capital and the country’s trade (Schmetzer, 2010, p. 13). However, a 
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quick glimpse at the Forbes Top 10 list of richest persons in 
Indonesia would make one think that almost everyone there were 
locals. Surprisingly, seven out of ten are actually EC, two are 
Indonesians, and one is Indian. The seven are EC who changed their 
names into Indonesian-sounding names after World War II. 
According to Chua (2011), at least half of the billionaires in the 
country are Chinese. Observers say this number is much higher 
because many EC in some countries are still reluctant to admit they 
are of Chinese descent, fearing discrimination.  
Malaysia 
Malaysia’s current rupture as a multi-ethnic society is actually a 
product of the colonial era when the British tried to define racially 
segregated roles for Malays and EC or “baba-nyonya” (Debernardi, 
2004, p. 36). Debernardi (2014) posits that although there was a 
policy of religious pluralism in Malaysia during the postcolonial 
period, Islam is still central to Malay ethnicity (p. 11). The Chinese 
were able to reproduce their way of life in the Straits settlements. In 
Penang, Debernardi (2014) notes that most Chinese came as contract 
workers and were free to undertake other ventures after working for 
a year (pp. 20-21). Oftentimes, they became intermediaries in the 
Straits produce. Debernardi (2004, p. 35) claims that many elite 
Chinese used financial capital in order to increase their social capital. 
For instance, they donated sums of money to build various  
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communal institutions. Chinese education was not available in 
Malaysia until the twentieth century. Families who wanted their 
children to have a grasp of Confucian classics and Chinese culture 
had to either hire a private tutor or send their children to China 
(Debernardi, 2004, p. 23). The latter was more expensive, of course. 
This is probably one of the reasons why EC here have developed a 
distinct identity far from the Malays and from the Chinese in 
China. 
From Independence until the late 1960s, Malaysian economy 
was dominated by foreign investment and EC capital (Leong, 2006, 
p. 193). Yen (2008) cites the government’s New Economic Policy 
which aimed at “correcting” the economic imbalance as one of the 
observable features during this time. According to Leong (2006), 
this policy was responsible for increasing the equity of the 
bumiputra from four percent in 1970 to about 20 percent in 1997 
(p. 194). It became a requirement for public institutions to take on 
Malay employees and 30 percent of the labor force in private 
companies had to be Malay (Yen, 2008, p. 27). In response to this 
policy, the EC business community strived to be more competitive 
through organizational restructuring and political alliance (Leong, 
2006, p. 192). The wealthy Chinese faction of elite EC shifted from 
supporting collective Chinese to developing ties with patrons of the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (Nonini, 2015, p. 
217). Although this was a prominent characteristic of EC in 
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Malaysia, this was also a visible practice among EC in other SEAn 
countries. On the other hand, the EC were also the ones who 
dominated the communist movement in the country despite 
attempts to recruit Malays and Indians (Gungwu, 2000, p. 32; Chea, 
2009, p. 133).  
Because of political discrimination, economic restrictions, and 
unequal educational and cultural treatment, some EC in Malaysia left 
the country for developed countries such as the United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, France, and Singapore (Kang, 
2015). This migration contributed to the “brain drain” in Malaysia as 
more than a million EC with higher education and skills had 
emigrated abroad (Kang, 2015, p. 322). Furthermore, the bumiputra 
population is anticipated to increase from 19.2 million in 2015 to 26 
million by 2040, and the Indian population from two to 2.3 million. 
Despite this, Forbes data says that the richest nationals in Malaysia 
are still the EC. Among the top 10 richest men in the country, only 
three are not of Chinese origin: they are Malay, Thai, and Sri Lankan 
Tamil.  
Philippines  
According to Hau (2014), the struggle of EC in the Philippines is a 
product of “economic nationalism, political disenfranchisement, and 
racial discrimination” (p. 209). Their relationship with the locals has 
had varying degrees over time. During Spanish colonization, EC in  
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the Philippines took pragmatic advantage of the colonial masters 
who were providing benefits to the converts to ensure their loyalty 
(Chu, 2015, p. 220). However, they continued to observe the rituals 
and religious practices of their ancestors (Guerrero, 2015, p. 66). 
Interestingly, the Spanish wanted to separate the EC from the locals 
to prevent them from cooperating with each other. However, they 
eventually saw the negative effects of this on economic gains due to 
the EC’s role as traders and middlemen. Because the EC 
monopolized the trade between Manila and China and established 
themselves near Spanish settlements, the Spanish began to think that 
they were indispensable (Wickerberg, 2015, p. 177). 
During the 1896 revolution, the Chinese in the Philippines 
participated in the struggle for freedom against the Spanish. Chinese 
schools closed down during the Japanese occupation and in effect, 
Chinese children entered Philippine schools where they interacted 
more with Filipino children (Tan, 1988, p. 187). The Hua Zhi 
(Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerilla Forces) contributed to 
the liberation movement of the Philippines and has always been 
identified with the national democratic movement in the country 
(Hau, 2014, pp. 173-174). Hau (2014) also posits that the 
participation of EC in the Philippine leftist movement is an integral 
aspect of the country’s revolutionary experience (p. 174). 
Tan (1988) provides a very interesting analysis on how the EC 
began to embrace Filipino culture and identity. The first-generation 
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Chinese realized that they were already isolated from China through 
space and time and even gave up the idea that they would soon 
return to China. The second generation who were born in the 
Philippines saw the country as home and acculturated better than 
their parents. The third generation’s outlook, attitudes, and values 
are now more local than those of their grandparents and parents. In 
addition to what Tan has mentioned, the third-generation Chinese 
are more oriented to the outside world through the schools and can 
better decide on their own. They can grow up knowing less and less 
about Chinese culture and more and more about the local cultures. 
Due to the EC’s economic gains, the government institutionalized 
several anti-EC measures in the country. In 1948, EC were banned 
from operating stalls in the public markets. This was followed by the  
Retail Trade Naturalization Law of 1954 where non-Filipino citizens, 
specifically Chinese citizens, were barred from the retail industry. Of 
course, the Filipino First Policy in 1961 also contributed to this. As a  
result of these anti-Chinese laws, the EC took the stringent, tedious, 
and expensive process of naturalization (Tan, 1988, p. 185). Today, 
the EC’s economic power in the Philippines is remarkable: they make 
up only one to two percent of the population but their share of 
market capital is between 50 to 55 percent (Hodder, 2015, p. 437). 
Forbes data says that  among the top 10 richest people in the 
Philippines, eight are EC and two are Spanish-Filipinos. 
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Singapore 
The EC arrived in Singapore as soon as the British colonizers 
established the port in 1819. They became “useful” to the British 
when they acted as agents in the trafficking of coolies who were in 
great demand by the colonial rulers (Lee, 2013, pp. 466-467). Because 
of their knowledge in the English language, they also became 
intermediaries for large British companies (Peranakan Museum). As 
in the countries mentioned earlier, there existed a division between 
EC in Singapore based on their work and cultural background: the 
Babas and the Sinkheks. While the first group was more westernized 
since its members were engaged in shipping, banking, and tin mining 
which required knowledge in the English language, the second group 
remained loyal to China and was involved in trading and the local 
production of pepper, gambir, rubber, and others (Lee, 2013, p. 468). 
This dichotomy between the two kinds of EC in Singapore actually 
led to their diverging fortunes. While most authors focus on the 
economic gains of EC in Singapore, Warren (2009) offers a different 
view, focusing on the discrimination inflicted by the British against 
the EC in Singapore. For instance, in his book he demonstrates how 
rickshaw pullers were forced to live in dire conditions with little 
salary. In most cases, the perpetrators were fellow EC who went there 
first and established themselves before them.  
Consistent with the practice in other countries, the women were 
not part of the migrant Chinese society until the 1860s when the 
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Chinese were already allowed to bring their wives with them. The 
absence of family, a Confucian vital element, was according to 
Warren (2008) a very important factor in the experience of 
newcomers as they tried to institutionalize their lives in Singapore (p. 
155). The consequent formation of voluntary organizations was of 
big help to them. In the nineteenth century, the earlier EC who went 
there usually led Singapore’s Chinese communities. 
The culture among EC in Singapore is practically an admixture of 
Chinese culture, the multi-ethnic Singaporean culture, and western 
culture, owing to the fact that Singapore is a “melting pot of 
cultures.” Suryadinata (2007) presents a very interesting analysis of 
Singaporean Chinese. According to him, Chinese in Singapore 
maintain cultural relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong for 
ideological reasons (Suryadinata, 2007, p. 21). Expectedly, seven out 
of ten EC are listed by Forbes as the wealthiest persons in Singapore. 
The others are Indian, Brazilian, and New Zealander. 
Analysis: towards the (im)possibility of ASEAN Identity  
among EC in insular SEA 
This study presents a still inconclusive analysis on the 
(im)possibility of ASEAN Identity among EC in  SEA. 
Problematizing the identity of EC in ASEAN is twofold. As 
Chinese who migrated in various parts of SEA, these people 
embraced a fusion of Chinese civilization and local cultures with  
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their own unique identities (see Lee, 2013). The convergence of 
external and internal factors had resulted in the uniqueness of 
identification and assimilation in each SEAn country. Among these 
are the varying degrees of accommodation the colonizers offered 
them as well as the diversified hospitality of the local governments. 
The result was a distinct identity separate from the “Chineseness" of 
people in China and at the same time, different from the local 
cultures. This became highly visible in the case of the baba-nyonyas 
of Malaysia. 
To some extent, this preliminary research supports Suryadinata 
(2007) and Hau’s (2014) studies that claim that EC in SEA is 
heterogenous in nature; thus, we cannot assume that all EC share this 
culture. The experiences of EC in the region are different. Even the 
language used by the EC has its own politics. This study shows how 
language has become a political weapon for and against the EC. The 
knowledge of Chinese, English, and/or the local languages has 
contributed to both their individual and collective histories. This has 
also defined their social classes which became bases for assimilation 
and antagonism coming from both the colonizers and the locals. This 
has been obvious in the cases of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore. 
For some countries, historical processes have contributed to the 
EC’s identification rather than alienation while for some, these 
produced a coping mechanism. Moreover, the unavailability of 
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Chinese schools also forced the EC to identify more with the locals. 
This “forced interaction” became obvious in the cases of Brunei, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Those who could not 
fathom this chose to remigrate to other countries instead. 
Additionally, since EC are collective among themselves,13 
members usually help each other out in business interests. This, 
according to Suyardinata (2007), is a product of their history of 
survival as immigrants (p. 68). Hirschman (1988) further explains 
this in saying that the concentration in the small business sector 
produced great reliance on family and kin labor (pp. 28-29). This 
continues to the present time although the current situation may 
have a different characteristic. This and the fact that there are many 
more EC organizations make them more predisposed to collectivity 
(see Yen, 1995). Although the EC have frequently been stereotyped 
as being parochial and too inclined to relate only with their own 
community (see Pausacker, 2005), the EC in SEA have also 
experienced discrimination and have become victims of exclusivity. 
Oftentimes, this is a product of EC being collectively hardworking 
and quite familiar with the pragmatic dynamics of colonial 
governments. They eventually learned to cope with the conditions 
at the local level. Consequently, the governments became more 
accommodating to them in varying degrees. As a result, the EC now 
hold economic power. In the country studies with the exemption of  
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Brunei, EC occupy at least seven places in the Top 10 richest 
persons list in their respective countries.  
The issue of EC wanting to acquire a Chinese nationality is not 
quite a big issue in SEA nowadays even though China is now the 
world’s second largest economy. Suryadinata (2007) argues that the 
issue has resurfaced only as Chinese in China became alarmed (p. 
302). Since the Chinese are perceived as very pragmatic people and in 
fact have had histories of acting as middlemen between Asia and 
Europe, they may adopt some practices that remain beneficial to 
them even without having to acquire Chinese nationality. Regardless 
of their economic achievements at present, being Chinese is not the 
sole basis for doing business. Instead, both Chinese in China and in 
SEA have been eventually narrowed down to captive markets. 
However, towards the resinification of EC, Hau (2014) mentions that 
the “Chineseness” of Chinese-Filipino grants them access to the 
social capital coming from the region (p. 219). 
Nonetheless, it is likewise important to note that EC in SEA have 
also participated in the nationalist struggles for independence in 
some insular SEA countries. As Gungwu (2000) mentions, one of the 
key developments of EC in SEA is their willingness to involve 
themselves with politics (p. 25). This has been obvious in the cases of 
the Philippines and Indonesia in their struggle for independence 
against the Spanish and the Dutch. In Malaysia, the EC used to 
dominate the communist movement. This contradicts the idea that 
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EC are only concerned with their own economic gains. With the 
exemption of Singapore, and in varying degrees, EC were excluded in 
the nation-building processes after World War II. However, when 
the nation-states eventually realized their importance, EC were 
allowed to join in the local affairs. 
It is also interesting that in these countries, there was a division 
between elite and lower-class EC which started during the colonial 
era. In each country, there also developed different terms in referring 
to EC. In some ways, these are meant to delineate one social class 
from the other. A comprehensive discussion of this was earlier made 
by Suryadinata in his 1987 article, “EC in SEA: Problems and 
Prospects,” in which he elaborates that the heterogeneity of Chinese 
in countries was based on the distinctions made by the language used 
by these Chinese, their economic status, or their political 
orientation. Especially in the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia, we see 
how the lower classes were more indigenized than their higher class 
counterparts. 
Furthermore, because of the challenges they experience in their 
new adopted countries and the historic alienation they feel towards 
China, EC will feel more affinities with people of the same group 
within a country, further strengthening the idea of distinctiveness 
which was laid out earlier. Debernardi (2004) posits that it is actually 
culture that links the EC outside China with the form and content of 
Chinese civilization (p. 130). In case of regional organizations among  
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EC, it is noticeable that most organizations have ties not with the 
organizations in SEA but in China and Taiwan.14 That is why 
connections among EC in SEA are still very few or lacking.  
I am inclined to say that I share the same idea with Suryadinata 
(2007) that when EC are asked with whom they associate themselves 
better (especially for later-generation Chinese), it would be the 
country where they grew up or their adopted country. Southeast Asia 
serves as their home, not as a region per se but as a geographical 
location where their adopted countries are located.  
With the initial historical review of literature that this paper has 
gathered, I believe that EC’s conception of an ASEAN Identity is still 
very little if not non-existent. Moreover, people in the ASEAN still 
compete with each other. For instance, some nationalities do not 
want to be associated with the others because of certain stereotypes. 
Furthermore, the integration in economy has not yet resulted in 
cultural integration and appreciation. However, the distinctness in 
the identities that the EC have developed might give way towards the 
possibility of an ASEAN Identity. After all, regardless of our 
ethnicities, we still share common problems as nations and peoples 
which might be bases for solidarity. That is why appreciating the 
differences and diversity among member states is a key to identifying 
ASEAN Identity/ies.  
However, unlike the earlier generations of EC who returned to 
China after gaining their economic agenda in SEA, the present 
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generation of EC is now more assimilated into the local cultures. 
They were slowly disintegrated from the Chinese culture in China 
through unfamiliarity in transitory cultures and languages. Thus, 
there is an increasingly thinning connection between EC in SEA with 
Chinese in China. Although the former were able to learn Chinese 
culture and history remotely,15 they also learned SEAn culture and 
history at the same time. With the presence of the Internet, an 
ASEAN Identity/ies might be more possible as EC in SEA begin to 
realize their similarities collectively. In their attempt to build the 
nation after independence, the EC were forgotten by governments 
and the communities reduced them into a source of economic gains. 
In the future, their presence might be a factor in strengthening the 
multicultural concept of ASEAN Identity/ies which is primarily 
“unity-in-diversity.” 
Notes 
1. I will use the term “ethnic Chinese” instead of “overseas 
Chinese” to emphasize that the perspective is not coming 
from China but from SEA—that the Chinese here have 
Chinese origins but eventually chose to settle in this part of 
the world. This is contrary to “overseas Chinese” which 
highlights that these people are Chinese and are living 
overseas (see Suryadinata 2001 & 2007). 
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2. In the earlier years of ASEAN as a region, there was really no 
document that spoke of ASEAN Identity. The latter was first 
mentioned in the ASEAN Vision 2020 (signed on 15 
December 1997):“We envision the entire SEA to be, by 2020, 
an ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history, aware 
of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional 
identity.” 
3. “China,” “Mainland China,” and “People’s Republic of 
China” will be used interchangeably in this paper.  
4. The term refers to the offspring of foreigner-local union, 
usually of ethnic Chinese and Malay origin (Lee, 2008, p. 
161). 
5. This usually refers to the second-, third-, and fourth-
generation Filipino-Chinese (see Hau, 2014, p. 141). 
6. This is different from what Suryadinata (2007, pp. 58-60) 
refers as the “New Chinese Migration” wherein the target 
countries for migration is the “developed” West (which 
includes the United States, Canada, and Australia) as first 
choice. Singapore and Malaysia serve only as the second 
choice while Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China are 
the third choice. This followed Deng Xiao Ping’s 
introduction of the open-door policy in the late 1970s.  
7. They were called “returned overseas Chinese.” 
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8. Even the type of Chinese taught in Chinese schools was 
different from the one widely used in China (Suryadinata 
2001, 57). 
9. Dutch in Indonesia; the Spanish in the Philippines; the 
British in Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei. 
10. It should be noted that the lack of information on EC in 
Brunei is due to the dearth of research about them both in 
the country and even outside. 
11. These are sectors in which non-Bruneians are allowed to 
own. 
12. This was part of Prof. Dr. Irianto’s comments during the 
9th NGGW held at Kyoto University on 26 - 27 September 
2016. 
13. Traditional Chinese societies usually have four or five 
generations living together in one siheyuan or compound. 
14. Although there are trade delegations happening between 
ASEAN countries in China (see Leong, 2016; See & Go Bon 
Juan, 2006), these are more loose umbrella organizations and 
most are related only to trade. 
15. Some are being sent to China for a short time but this is not 
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